





















Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Science (Finance) at 
Concordia University 





© Xiaoyang Sha, 2016 
  
 CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY 
School of Graduate Studies 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
By: Xiaoyang Sha 
Entitled: 
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Master 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the 
accepted standards with 
respect to originality and quality. 
Signed by the final examining committee: 
                                               Chair 
    Rahul Ravi                 Examiner 
Saif Ullah                    Examiner 
Frederick Davis              Supervisor 
                         Thomas Walker              Co-Supervisor 
Approved by 
________________________________________________ 
Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director 
________________________________________________ 















This paper examines the takeover rumour effects of potential U.S. acquisition targets on rival firms. On 
average, rival firms earn positive abnormal returns during the rumour period, despite the type and outcome 
of the rumour. Specifically, rumours concerning industry takeover activities and those regarding targets 
that undergo financial distress provide higher rival firm returns around the rumour date, while rumours that 
are seconded by analysts tend to lead to negative abnormal returns for rival firms. Rivals that subsequently 
become acquisition targets within one year following the rumour experience significantly higher abnormal 
returns. In related tests, we find that rumours proven to be credible, rumours denied by targets, rumours 
driven by insiders, rumours involving the PE finder, and rumours containing multiple informative signals 
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Previous studies have documented the effect of takeover rumours on the stock price of 
target firms (see Gupta and Misra, 1988; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Clarkson, Joyce, and 
Tutticci, 2006; Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008; Duso et al., 2011; Jain and Sunderman, 
2014). Consistent evidence has shown that target firms earn positive abnormal returns at the 
time of a rumour (see Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990; Chou, Tian, 
and Yin, 2010; Ahern and Sosyura, 2015; Betton, Davis, and Walker, 2016). However, the 
effect of takeover rumours on rivals of rumoured targets remains unknown, which is 
surprising considering that rumours could signal the market of profit opportunities for rival 
firms. Under the efficient market hypothesis, the market could process new information 
rapidly. In fact, significant rivals’ abnormal returns have been observed around merger 
announcement dates (see Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983; Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1983; 
Eckbo and Wier, 1985; Banerjee and Eckard, 1998; and Duso et al., 2007). Similarly, we 
expect to see significant change in rival’s performance around takeover rumour dates. In our 
paper, we examine how the market responds to takeover rumours through the changes in 
rivals’ stock prices. Our paper aims to provide evidence on rumours’ effects on rivals and 
contribute to the related literature through an event study. 
Song and Walkling (2000) developed the acquisition probability hypothesis to explain the 
increase in rivals’ abnormal returns after a merger announcement and argue that the 
announcement tends to increase the possibility of rival firms becoming acquisition targets as 
well. We examine rivals’ post-rumour takeover activity and explore whether rivals that 
eventually become targets themselves after merger rumours experience a more significant 
impact from rumours compared to those that do not become targets. In addition, we estimate 
a series of logistic regressions of rivals’ acquisition likelihood and different rumour types.  
As existing studies on rumours’ impact have mainly focus on target firms, our study can 
help shed some light on how merger rumours affect rivals by analysing their rumour period 
abnormal returns. By investigating specific rumours’ impact according to their information 
and credibility, as well as looking into rivals’ post-rumour acquisition behaviour, this paper is 




to provide a fairly thorough analysis of rumours’ effects on rival firms, both at the time of the 
event and future takeover activity. We contribute to the literature by showing price run-up in 
rivals at the time of rumours, which indicates that market information can be quickly 
captured in rivals’ stock prices. Though rumours’ credibility and informativeness do not have 
a consistent significant impact on rivals’ abnormal returns, they are statistically positive 
predictors for rivals’ future takeover activity. This implies that investors tend to underreact to 
rivals involved in informative or credible rumours; thus, we recommend that investors refine 
their trading strategies by raising additional attention to the potential investment opportunities 
in such rivals. 
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows. We briefly review the previous 
related literature in Section 2. Section 3 introduces data measurement and research 
methodology. Specifically, we use 2,015 initial U.S. rumours over the period of 2002 to 2011 
and locate a sample of 1,472 rival firms. In Section 4, we first conduct univariate and 
multivariate analyses to examine rumours’ effects by type, and then we employ logistic 
regression models to discover how specific rumour content helps to predict rivals’ post-
rumour acquisitions. We find consistent proof that rival firms earn significantly positive 
abnormal returns during the rumour period. In particular, rumours concerning industry 
takeover activities and those regarding targets that undergo financial distress provide higher 
rival abnormal return around the rumour date, while rumours that are seconded by analysts 
tend to lead to negative abnormal returns for rival firms. Such findings remain robust when 
we change the risk model to obtain expected returns or use an alternative event window. 
Rivals that subsequently become acquisition targets within one year following the rumour 
experience significantly higher abnormal returns. In related tests, we find that rumours 
proven to be credible, rumours denied by targets, rumours driven by insiders, rumours 
involving the Private Equity (PE) finder and rumours containing multiple informative signals 
are significant predictors of future rival acquisitions. A rival’s firm size is shown to be a 
negative predictor for future acquisition activity, which is consistent with previous literature. 





2. Literature review 
2.1 Rumours and measurement 
Prior to merger announcements, positive abnormal returns seen in target firms have been 
documented by extensive literature (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Dennis and McConnell, 
1986). Keown and Pinkerton (1981) attribute this to the existence of illegal trading due to 
insider information before the announcement. However, it is often difficult to identify an 
insider trading activity; an alternative explanation of such price run-up has thus come to exist. 
It is said that this kind of price increase could be the result of market anticipation, as investors 
have already been expecting this merger according to media speculation, even before the 
merger is announced (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). This kind of market anticipation usually 
results from rumours. 
To capture rumours, various proxies have been used in previous studies, though with 
certain flaws. As rumours typically originate from articles published in major newspapers and 
are usually not immediately confirmed by the merging firms, many studies obtain rumour 
information from major journals, such as the Wall Street Journal (Keown, Pinkerton, and 
Bolster, 1992; Jayaraman, Frye, and Sabherwal, 2001), Business Week (Mathur, Ike, and 
Waheed, 1995) and the Dow Jones News Retrieval (DJNR) system (Schwert, 2000). 
Recently, because more productive proxies are provided by the Internet, novel Internet 
indices such as the Hotcopper Internet Discussion Site (IDS) (Clarkson, Joyce, and Tutticci, 
2006) and Google search volume (Siganos, 2013) have been utilised to capture rumour 
characteristics. Ahern and Sosyura (2015) use the media coverage of merger rumours and 
conclude that experience, educational background and professional expertise of journalists 
can greatly influence media accuracy. It is clear that simply looking at one journal or a single 
index from the Internet cannot give a complete picture of merger rumours.  
Studies concerning the effects of merger rumours on target firms analyse their performance 
through stock price changes and abnormal returns (see Gupta and Misra, 1988; Jarrell and 
Poulsen, 1989; Clarkson, Joyce, and Tutticci, 2006; Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008; 
Duso et al., 2011; Jain and Sunderman, 2014). Consistent evidence has shown that target 




1981; Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990; Chou, Tian, and Yin, 2010; Ahern and Sosyura, 2015; 
Betton, Davis, and Walker, 2016). Current classifications of rumours are either based on their 
credibility (Chou, Tian, and Yin, 2010) or specific rumour content (Betton, Davis, and 
Walker, 2016). 
 
2.2 Rival and comparison studies 
Rivals are commonly defined as firms with the same Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code as the targets (see Eckbo, 1983; Eckbo and Wier, 1985; Hertzel, 1991). Song and 
Walkling (2000) use firms within the same Value Line industry as their rivals. However, most 
literature concerning rival gives a rather obscure description or uses the term as a given 
without specification of its definition. 
The results of studies concerning a merger announcement’s impact on a rival’s stock return 
are mixed. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) and Banerjee and Eckard (1998) document 
significant value losses for competitors. Yet most literature has indicated that rival firms 
experience a significant increase in abnormal returns as a positive effect from a merger 
announcement (see Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983; Eckbo and Wier, 1985; and Duso et al., 
2007). Respective explanations have been given for such findings. One is that the merger 
announcements signal the market of profit opportunities of the rival firms. Song and Walkling 
(2000) develop the acquisition probability hypothesis that explains the increase in rivals’ 
abnormal returns after a merger announcement and argues that the announcement tends to 
increase the possibility of rival firms subsequently becoming acquisition targets as well.   
Research on rivals’ reaction to events in the context of mergers and acquisitions is limited 
to announcements, and the effects of takeover rumours on rivals remain unknown. 
 





3.1.1 Rumour data 
To obtain the rumour data for our sample group, we1 first defined a rumour as any public 
conjecture mentioned in business-related journals and/or publications that explicitly indicates 
a public U.S. firm, from the Centre for Research in Security Price (CRSP) database, to be a 
potential target for a future takeover. Combining most data sources mentioned in related 
studies, we began by going through databases including the S&P Capital IQ, S&P Takeover 
Talk, Zephyr, as well as online services, like Factiva and Pro-Quest, where thousands of other 
major publications are included, such as the Wall Street Journal, Economist, Bloomberg, 
BusinessWeek, Dow Jones Newswires and so on. Next, to take a closer look at these takeover 
rumours, we developed a proprietary algorithm containing the keywords of “strategic 
alternative”, “buyout”, “sale of the firm”, “looking to be acquired”, “takeover candidate”, 
“takeover chatter” and other takeover terms, using S&P Takeover Talk, S&P Capital IQ and 
Zephyr, accompanied by a Google article search. Then, by employing the same algorithm to 
Factiva and Pro-Quest, we read through each rumour article to ensure that we did not exclude 
any takeover rumours and to guarantee the high accuracy of our rumour data. Each time a 
takeover rumour was identified, we incorporated the company name of the target firm to 
avoid any repetition of preceding rumours. By doing so, we ensured that the target group 
includes only the initial takeover rumour within a period of 90 days.   
To roll out the possibility of a normal merger announcement delay, we verified all rumours 
by checking their announcement dates (if available) and excluded the ones that have an 
announcement on the same day or one day after the rumour. We also excluded mergers of 
equals or assets sales. 
Thus far, we have collected information on 2,074 rumours from January 1, 2002 to 
December 31, 2011. However, when we conduct the event study on these 2,074 rumour 
targets to obtain their abnormal returns, 2,015 targets have sufficient data during the event 
window we need. Thus we arrive at our final rumour group of 2,015 firms. Panel A of Table 1 
reveals the yearly distribution of our rumour data. The number of rumours increased every 
year and reached the peak of 424 in 2011, the last year of our sample period. 
                                                             
1 Special thanks to Professor Frederick Davis, as the rumour data used in this paper were collected, compiled 




3.1.2 Rumour types 
Once identified as an initial rumour in our data, the rumour was assigned to one or more of 
the first 18 basic rumour types based on its content, as specified in Panel A of Table 2. We 
created a rumour type, “Rumour credible”, for rumours that led to a takeover announcement, 
of which the date can be found in Security Data Company’s (SDC) US Mergers and 
Acquisitions database. Using the initial 18 rumour types and based on how much information 
is included in the rumour, we generated two additional rumour types, “Informative” and 
“Speculative”. Excluding types of chatter and options, if at least 3 pieces of rumour 
information were true, we considered a rumour to be “Informative”. Otherwise, if the rumour 
was simply of chatter or options, we categorised it as “Speculative”.   
Panel B of Table 1 gives the distribution of different rumour types in our rumour data and 
the number of industries covered by each rumour type. Specifically, the acquirer was 
mentioned in nearly half of the rumours (857), 514 rumours contained more than 3 types of 
takeover-related information and were considered informative, and only a quarter (415) of the 
rumours led to an actual announcement. Here we use the first 3-digit of the SIC to identify an 
industry. Overall, 177 industries are included in our rumour data. 
3.1.3 Rival firms 
We defined a rival as a firm that contains the same first 3-digit SIC code as its 
corresponding target firm and has a size that is within a 30% range difference of its target 
firm’s size. Following previous studies, we first restricted the rival firms to be within the 
same industry2 as the rumour target. Using the SIC code from COMPUSTAT-Capital IQ and 
controlling the time difference between the rival’s data date and rumour date to be within 2 
years, we located a pool of potential rivals for rumour targets. Then, we sorted the possible 
rivals according to their data dates and sizes and kept the one whose data is closest to the 
rumour date and that has a size within a 30% difference margin of the target’s size. However, 
since many firms appeared more than once in this rival group, the results could be skewed 
due to these repetitive firms. Thus, to have relatively unbiased results for the rivals, we then 
                                                             
2 To identify rival firms and industry-level control variables (i.e. concentration ratio, sales shock), which are 
introduced later in the paper, industry firms includes all firms with the same 3-digit SIC code. If there are fewer 




removed the firms that appeared more than once in the group and returned to choose the 
second or third best match of the potential rivals (if there are any). By doing so, we arrive at 
1,708 rival firms. Out of these 1,708 rivals, 1,472 had sufficient data on their abnormal 
returns around the rumour date.  
3.1.4 Control variables 
Cornett et al. (2011) summarised previous literature on takeover target characteristics, 
examining both firm- and industry-level variables that can be used to predict takeover target 
candidacy, and they presented the predictability in merger candidacy of such variables. 
According to their results, we kept the variables that are significantly helpful to predict firm 
merger candidacy as our control variables. By incorporating such variables in the multivariate 
regressions and logistic models, we controlled additional factors that affect rivals’ abnormal 
returns and future takeover behaviour and further explore takeover rumours’ impact on rivals. 
In addition, we aimed to provide insight into the relation between rivals’ characteristics and 
their performance at the time of a rumour as well as the post-rumour period. 
As the calculations for some of these variables involve data from two years back, we used 
the quarterly data from January 1998 to December 2011 from COMPUSTAT-Capital IQ. 
Table 2 Panel B gives the definitions of these control variables.   
3.1.5 Post-rumour takeover activity 
As the rumours’ effects on the rival firms could potentially lead to rivals’ future 
acquisitions, we then checked rivals’ post-rumour takeover activity and explored their 
acquisition likelihood. We collected the announcement dates for rival firms after the rumour 
date from the SDC’s US Mergers and Acquisitions database (if available). By excluding 
announcements of firm repurchase and firms going private, we found that 74 rivals 
subsequently became a target within 3 years after a rumour, 37 of which become one within 
the first year following the rumour. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Event study analysis 




we conducted a standard event study using the market model. We use 100 trading days to 
estimate the expected returns, where a minimum of 70 valid returns should be found within 
these 100 days. We left a 50-day gap between the end of estimation window and the 
beginning of the event window to reduce the likelihood that the risk model estimation would 
be affected by the event-induced return variance. 
We first collected 11 days3 of abnormal returns for the rival firms to exam the cross-
sectional effect from takeover rumours. Then, following earlier literature on the 
announcement period for abnormal returns, we obtained CARs during the most commonly 
used event windows, (0,+1), (-1,+1), (-2,+2) and (-5,+5). CARs are later used to create test 
statistics.  
3.2.2 Multivariate analysis of abnormal returns 
By using the CAR(-1,+1) from the event study as our dependent variable, we successively 
included dummy variables of different rumour types and control variables, as mentioned 
above, to create multivariate regressions and test how rumour types affect the CARs of rival 
firms differently. To further explore their relation, we first replaced the dependent variable 
with CAR(-1,+1) using market-adjusted model to estimate expected returns and then used 
CAR(-2,+2)4 as the dependent variable to conduct robustness tests and examine whether the 
results hold with different abnormal return calculation methods and alternative event 
windows.  
3.2.3 Logistic estimation of acquisition probability 
Using the announcement dates for rival firms that subsequently became takeover targets, 
we then examined the relation between different rumour types and rivals’ acquisition 
likelihood using logistic regression models. In addition to testing the rivals that became 
targets within the calendar year following the rumour, we employed the same regression 
models to rivals that became a target within 3 years as our robustness test. 
 
 
                                                             
3 The 11-day event window includes day -5 to day +5, where day 0 is the rumour date. 





4. Empirical results 
4.1 Cross-sectional abnormal returns for rival firms 
Following Song and Walking (2000), Table 3 presents the abnormal returns to rival firms 
over an 11-day window surrounding the rumour date along with results for a t-test for 
differences in means and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in 
medians. Though moving in a relatively moderate manner, rivals’ abnormal returns had an 
identical pattern of changes during the rumour period as those of the rumour targets (Betton, 
Davis, and Walker, 2016). Similar to the findings on target firms (see Pound and Zeckhauser, 
1990; Ahern and Sosyura, 2015; Betton, Davis, and Walker, 2016), rivals also experienced a 
noticeable rise in abnormal returns around the rumour date. From day -1 to day +1, rivals’ 
abnormal returns increased from 0.02% to 0.20% on average. As rivals’ abnormal returns 
move rather slowly across the event period, this rise is the most noticeable change for the 
rival group. This indicates that there is a possible impact on rivals from these takeover 
rumours. The changes in median abnormal returns have a similar trend as the means. 
Significant abnormal returns are found across 3 rumour periods. Abnormal returns to rivals 
average 0.37% for rumour period (-1,+1), 0.50% during a longer period (-5,+5), and 0.35% 
for period (0,+1) at 1%  significance level. These significant abnormal returns of rivals 
around the rumour date suggest that rivals are influenced by rumours regardless of rumours’ 
credibility. This corresponds to previous finding on target firms that they earn positive 
abnormal returns at the time of a rumour as well (see Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Pound and 
Zeckhauser, 1990; Chou, Tian, and Yin, 2010; Ahern and Sosyura, 2015; Betton, Davis, and 
Walker, 2016). 
To shed additional light on the impact from these rumours, we proceeded to examine the 
relation between rivals’ CARs and different rumour types in the following sections. 
 
4.2 Univariate analysis 
In Table 4, we begin our analysis of rivals CARs around the rumour period (-1,+1), 
conditional on rumour types. This is the first time in the literature that takeover rumours have 




addition to the rumour types introduced in Table 2, we included two categories of rivals’ post-
rumour takeover activity here, namely “Rival acquired” and “Rival acquired one year”. As 
mentioned in Section 3, “Rival acquired” is for rivals that subsequently became a takeover 
target within 3 years after the rumour date, and “Rival acquired one year” only includes rivals 
that became a target within the first year following the rumour. In accordance with Table 4, 
we conducted a t-test for differences in means, as well as a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-
sum test for differences in medians. 
With a significance level of 5% for CAR(-1,+1) on average, when including all rumour 
types, rival firms experienced significant positive CARs for 3 rumour types, “Industry 
activity”, “Options” and “Rumour credible”. Particularly, for rumours concerning takeover 
activity within the industry, the results are significant for both the t-test and Wilcoxon median 
test, at 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Rivals of these takeover rumour targets 
experience significant 1.44% CARs on average. This suggests that takeover rumours, 
specifically those related to industry activities, have a significant impact on the rivals’ returns 
during the rumour period. This price run-up could be brought by investors anticipating a 
future takeover of the rival of this rumour target, when there are ongoing takeover activities 
in this industry. This confirms the finding that industry merger waves creates overall wealth 
in the same industry (Harford, 2003). The t-statistic for rumours that become true, “Rumour 
credible”, is significant and this implies that rumours which were proven to be credible and 
led to announcements afterwards significantly enhanced the returns for targets’ rivals and led 
to 0.70% CAR on average.  
Another interesting finding is for rivals acquired within one year after a rumour (“Rival 
acquired one year”); their returns were significantly related to the post-rumour activity, yet 
this significant result did not remain when we examined all rivals that subsequently became 
the takeover target (“Rival acquired”). One possible explanation for this could be that for 
rivals acquired one year after a rumour came out, their takeover activity may not be the result 
of the rumour itself. As for rivals acquired within 365 calendars days following the rumour 
date, they had an average of 1.89% CARs around the rumour date, which is the highest 




with the acquisition probability hypothesis proposed by Song and Walkling (2000), which 
attributes the abnormal returns for rivals of initial targets to an increased probability that 
these rivals will be targets themselves. 
Due to the fact that quite a few rumours in our data contain more than one piece of 
takeover information, a single rumour may fall into multiple rumour categories. Thus, it may 
not be convincing to reveal the true influence each takeover rumour has on the rival by 
looking at individual rumour types when one rumour could be a combination of two or more 
types. We then moved on to test the effect of different rumour types simultaneously on the 
rival’s CAR. 
 
4.3 Multivariate analysis 
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models that include every rumour type 
and all the control variables mentioned in the former part. We created dummy variables for 
each rumour type. That is, the value of rumour dummy variable equals one if that rumour 
contains a certain type of takeover information, and zero otherwise. For the dependent 
variable, we used CAR(-1,+1) obtained using standard event study methodology with 
expected returns based on the market model. To test our results’ robustness, we changed the 
dependant variable to CAR(-1,+1) using market-adjusted model to obtain expected returns 
and then replaced CAR(-1,+1) with an alternative event window (-2,+2) as a new dependent 
variable. 
4.3.1 Abnormal return regressions 
As shown in Table 5, we examined the impact of different rumour content and rivals’ post-
rumour takeover activity on rivals’ CARs around the rumour date. Specifically, we include 
the 18 basic rumour types in Model 1, and then we controlled for rumours’ credibility and 
rivals’ future takeover behaviour respectively in Model 2 and Model 3. Corresponding to the 
first 3 models, control variables predicting takeover candidacy (as per Cornett et. al, 2011) 
were incorporated in Model 5 to Model 7. In Model 4, we assessed how a rumour’s 
informativeness affected the rival’s performance as well. 




rumours that contain information about analysts’ opinions on the takeover (“Analyst source”), 
target firms undergoing financial problems (“Financial distress”) and takeover activities 
within the industry (“Industry activity”). Specifically, “Industry activity” appears to have a 
significant positive impact on rivals’ CARs in Model 1 and Model 5, which reinforces our 
finding in Table 4. Rumours where the target firm is reported to have financial struggles 
(“Financial distress”) significantly drive up the rival’s CAR, and remain positive, yet 
insignificant, with the presence of the control variables. As a firm’s financial conditions affect 
its industry by impacting firm inventory, product quality and pricing (Hofer, Dresner, and 
Windle, 2005; Phillips and Sertsios, 2013), investors may project similar firms as potential 
future takeover targets. In contrast, rumours based on analyst opinions (“Analyst source”) 
have a negative impact on rivals’ CAR. This can be interpreted as the investors’ faith in 
analysts and their disbelief of rival firms being acquired. 
When we control rumours’ credibility in Model 2 and 6, though credible rumours continue 
to have a positive impact on rivals’ CAR, as shown in Table 4, they lose their significance 
here. It may be the case that it is not the credibility, but rather the perceived outcome from 
investors that affects rivals’ stock prices. Rivals’ post-rumour takeover activity does not 
appear to have a significant impact in Models 3 and 7. This implies that investors appear to 
predict rivals’ future acquisition behaviours inaccurately. 
When controlling for a rumour’s informativeness in Model 4, the results for the dummy 
variables “Informative” and “Speculative” are not significant. Unlike the finding in rumour 
targets (Betton, Davis, and Walker, 2016), this suggests that the richness of information 
included in a rumour may not necessarily impact the rival’s abnormal returns.  
From Models 4 to 7, the results for two control variables, “ROA” and “Sales shock” 
appeared to have similar significance. A firm’s ROA is shown to be negatively related to its 
CAR at the 1% significance level, while the absolute difference between a firm’s two-year 
sales growth and the median industry two-year sales growth (“Sales shock”) is positively 
related to a rival’s CAR at the 5% significance level. Relating to the results of “Financial 
distress”, the significant negative relation between ROA and CAR could be explained by 




thus, the abnormal returns of these rivals may be driven up by this anticipation. Likewise, 
rival firms with extremely low sales growth could be seen as potential future takeover targets 
and consequently experience higher returns, which may explain the positive association 
between “Sales shock” and abnormal returns. This confirms previous findings that firms with 
less growth (Palepu, 1986; Song and Walkling, 2000) or low ROA (Akhigbe, Madura, and 
Whyte, 2004) are more likely to be acquired. 
When comparing the results of Model 5 with those of Model 1, we find that the 
significance level of the rumour variables is lowered with the presence of the control 
variables. This may result from the high levels of significance of some of the control 
variables. With the addition of control variables, models’ fitness improved, as seen in the 
increase of values of R2 and the adjusted R2 throughout the last 3 models. 
4.3.2 Robustness tests 
To avoid the possibility of the market model leading to misleading inferences, we first 
conducted a robustness test using the market-adjusted model to obtain rivals’ expected 
returns. As shown in Table 6, the results are quite similar to those in Table 5. Before including 
our control variables, “Analyst source” continued to negatively affect rivals’ abnormal 
returns, and “Financial distress” continued to have a positive impact at a similar significance 
level as that shown in Table 5. “Industry activity” was again proven to have a significant 
positive impact on rivals’ CARs. As in the results shown in Table 5, the significance levels 
for these rumour dummy variables were relatively reduced when control variables were 
added to the models. However, the significance of the results of “ROA” disappeared, while 
the coefficient of “Sales shock” remained significantly positive. Evidently, the results in 
Table 6 closely parallel those in Table 5. 
As previous studies on abnormal returns around takeover announcements have also 
examined other event windows, we then used an alternative event period (-2,+2) to determine 
whether the results were robust. Similarly, “Industry activity” continued to have a positive 
relationship with CARs at the 5% significance level in the first 3 models, and again its 
significance level dropped in Models 5 to 7 with the presence of control variables. In addition 




results, as shown in Table 7. As a highly liquid asset structure is found in many financially-
distressed firms (DeAngelo H., DeAngelo L. and Wruck, 2002) and relating to the results of 
“Financial distress”, rivals with higher cash ratios could be seen as potential takeover targets, 
which in turn may explain the positive relationship between “Cash ratio” and CARs. 
In sum, we found consistent evidence that rumours relating to industry takeover activities 
have a significant positive impact on rivals’ abnormal returns, regardless of a rumour’s 
credibility. This remained robust when we employed different risk models for abnormal 
returns calculations and alternative event windows. This implies that when there is a takeover 
surge in the industry, investors tend to believe that rivals of rumour targets could be the next 
takeover targets. And this conception, in turn, drives up the rumour period abnormal returns 
for rival firms. Other rumour types, like “Analyst source” and “Financial distress” also have 
significant effects on the rivals’ rumour period abnormal returns in some models. 
 
4.4 Post-rumour takeover activity of rival firms 
Through both univariate and multivariate analysis, there is sound evidence indicating that 
takeover rumours have a significant impact on rival firms, with additional findings on the 
impact of specific rumour content. It would be interesting to explore how rumour information 
helps to predict rivals’ post-rumour takeover activity. Out of the 1,472 rivals, 74 were 
acquired within 3 years after the rumour date, and 37 of these 74 rivals were acquired within 
365 calendars days. According to the univariate results in Table 4, the 37 rivals’ abnormal 
returns around the rumour period were significantly higher on average, while the abnormal 
returns for all 74 rivals that were later acquired were not. Thus, we used the 365-day period 
for our main analysis and later used the 3-year period for our robustness test. We created 
dummy variables for these two scenarios as “Rival acquired one year” and “Rival acquired”, 
where the dummy value equals one if the rival was acquired afterwards and zero otherwise. 
Using these dummy variables as our dependent variable, we employed logistic regressions to 
explore the predictive abilities different rumour types had on post-rumour rival acquisitions. 
The results from the logistic regressions could potentially help investors recognise valuable 




We input all rumour dummy variables from the multivariate regression models into the 
logistic regressions here as our main predictor variables and later combined the control 
variables in the regressions. 
For robustness purposes, we replaced “Rival acquired one year” with “Rival acquired” to 
assess whether the results hold without the time restraint on post-rumour activities. The test 
details and results are presented in the following part. 
4.4.1 Acquisition probability of rival firms 
After generating the new dummy variable, “Rival acquired one year”, two rumour types 
(“Financial distress” and “Management concerns”) have to be removed from the model due 
to the perfect prediction problem5. The results for the remaining rumour types are provided in 
Table 8. 
Rumours in aggregate are significant negative predictors (at the 1% significance level) by 
themselves (unreported) or when controlling for basic rumour types (Model 1, Table 8). 
Identical results were found for rumour credibility and rumour types (Betton, Davis, and 
Walker, 2016). However, when separating rumours by their content, four types of rumour 
content (“Financial advisor”, “Insider cited”, “PE Fund” and “Target denies”) stood out. In 
Model 1 and Model 3, these four rumour types were shown to be significantly positive 
predictors for rivals’ future takeover announcements and persist as predictors at the same 
significance level with the presence of control variables. The 5% significant positive 
coefficient for “Target denies” indicates the high possibility of rivals becoming future 
takeover targets when the rumour target denies its involvement in any takeover activities. 
“Financial advisor”, “Insider cited”, and “PE Fund” are reported to be strong predictors of a 
credible rumour (Betton, Davis, and Walker, 2016). This implies that takeover rumours with 
such information that could lead to a credible rumour are positive predictors for rivals’ future 
takeover activity as well. This interpretation was confirmed when we controlled for rumour’s 
credibility in Models 2 and 4. “Rumour credible” was a highly significant predictor. Such 
significant results for credible rumours are not seen in our multivariate analysis, which 
                                                             
5 That is, for these two rumour types, they can predict one situation of the post-rumour takeover activity 
perfectly. And it is not mathematically possible in a standard logistic regression to determine the coefficient and 




indicates that, contrary to the overreaction to rumour targets shown in previous empirical 
studies (see Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990; Ahern and Sosyura, 2015), investors seem to 
underreact to rivals, specifically those involved in credible rumours, around a rumour period. 
Studies on behavioural finance attribute investor’s underreaction to new information to their 
self-attribution bias (Daniel, Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, 1998), limited attention (Hirshleifer 
and Teoh, 2003), experience, sophistication, demographic factors and behavioural biases (Das 
and Krishnakumar, 2015). 
Informative rumours are also ideal for predicting rivals’ post-rumour takeover activities, as 
the coefficient for “Informative rumour” is positive at a 1% significance level in Model 5. As 
informative rumours did not appear to have significant impact on a rival’s CAR in our 
multivariate analysis, this could also be the result of investors’ poor investment perceptions 
on such rival firms, which corresponds to our findings regarding credible rumours. 
The results from Model 6, where we only considered control variables, show the 
significant negative predictive ability of a rival firm’s size. This is consistent with the finding 
on rumour target firms (Betton, Davis, and Walker, 2016) and confirms previous findings that 
smaller firms have a higher likelihood of being acquired (see Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; 
Song and Walkling, 1993; Moeller et al. 2004; Powell and Yawson 2007; Heron and Lie, 
2009). 
4.4.2 Robustness test 
When we increased the time period of rivals’ future takeover activity to 3 years and 
included a larger group of rivals that subsequently became acquisition targets, similar results 
were found, as shown in Table 9. “Financial advisor”, “Insider cited”, “PE Fund”, “Target 
denies”, “Rumour credible” and “Informative” remained statistically positive predicators, 
while a firm’s size continued to be a negative predicator. 
In sum, certain rumours appear to be helpful with projecting future rival acquisition 
behaviours. Consistent results from the main analysis and robustness test show that rumours 
proven to be credible, rumours denied by targets, rumours driven by an insider, rumours 
involving the PE finder and rumours containing multiple informative signals are significant 








This paper examined the takeover rumour effects on rivals of initial US acquisition-
rumoured firms. As existing studies on rumours’ effects have only looked at target firms, our 
study can help shed light on how merger rumours would affect rivals by empirically 
analysing their rumour period abnormal returns and post-rumour acquisition behaviour. 
Additionally, our paper is also one of the first studies to examine rumours’ effect by breaking 
down their content. 
We assessed 2,015 U.S. initial rumours over the period of 2002–2011 and located a sample 
of 1,472 rival firms. Each rumour was categorised into one or more rumours types according 
to its content, credibility and informativeness. 
From univariate analysis, we found that rival firms on average earn positive abnormal 
returns during a rumour period, despite the type and outcome of the rumour. Specifically, 
according to the results of our multivariate analysis, rumours concerning industry takeover 
activities and rumours that mention targets undergoing financial distress provide higher rival 
firms’ returns around the rumour date, while rumours that are seconded by analysts drive 
down rivals’ abnormal returns. However, rumours’ credibility and informativeness did not 
appear to have a consistent significant impact on rivals’ abnormal returns.  
Rivals that subsequently became acquisition targets within a year following a rumour 
experienced significantly higher abnormal returns. We also found that rumours denied by 
targets, rumours driven by an insider, and rumours involving the PE finder were significant 
predictors of future rival acquisitions. In addition, credible rumours and informative rumours 
were shown to be significant predictors. Regarding the results of our multivariate regressions, 
this suggests that though investors are quickly responding to market information in general, 
they do not seem to recognise the potential value of the rivals specifically involved in 
informative or credible rumours at the time when the news come out. 
By investigating specific rumours’ impact according to their information and credibility, as 




empirical study to examine rumours’ impact on rival firms by breaking down rumour content 
and provides a fairly thorough analysis of rumours’ impact on rival firms, both at the time of 
the event and future takeover activity. We contribute to the literature by showing price run-up 
in rivals at the time of rumour, which indicates that market information can be quickly 
incorporated into the stock price very early on. However, investors tend to underreact to 
rivals involved in informative or credible rumours, as these rumours turn out to be 
statistically positive predictors for rivals’ future takeover activity. Thus, we recommend that 
investors refine their trading strategies by paying additional attention to the potential 
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Table 1  
Summary statistics on takeover rumours 
We identify 2,015 initial U.S. takeover rumours from S&P Capital IQ, S&P Takeover Talk, Zephyr, 
Factiva, and Pro-Quest for the period 2002 through 2011. Panel A presents information on the number of 
rumours per year. We assign each rumour to one or more rumour types on the basis of its content. The 
distribution of different rumour types is presented in Panel B. 













Panel B: Rumour type distribution  
Rumour Type N 
Number of 
3-dig SIC 
Acquirer mentioned 857 105 
Analyst source 608 92 
Bidder denies 25 13 
Block purchase 64 22 
Chatter 564 86 
Financial distress 86 30 
Financial advisor 227 59 
Financing source 38 12 
Industry activity 252 39 
Insider cited 271 56 
Management concerns 47 15 
Options 359 81 
PE fund 234 63 
Synergy 79 24 
Target denies 12 7 
Target initiates 350 85 
Undervalued 372 74 
Unusual activity 38 19 
Rumour credible 415 85 
Informative 514 80 
Speculative 342 61 















Panel A specifies the definitions used to categorize rumour types. We assign each rumour to one or more. 
All rumour information is hand-collected and verified by reading through each rumour related news in 
S&P Takeover Talk, S&P Capital IQ, Zephyr, Factiva and ProQuest. Following Cornett et al. (2011), we 
identify variables that are helpful in predicting target merger candidacy and use them as control variables 
in our empirical analysis. Panel B provides definitions for these variables. To calculate the variables, we 
collect quarterly data from January 1998 to December 2011 from COMPUSTAT-Capital IQ. 
Panel A Rumour type definitions and data sources 
Rumour Type Definition 
Acquirer mentioned The name of potential bidder is mentioned in the rumour. 
Analyst source Rumour is the result of one or more analysts reasoning that a takeover 
seems logical. 
Bidder denies Bidding firm denies the parties are in negotiations of any kind. 
Block purchase Whenever a large purchase in the company is used as support for the 
rumour. 
Chatter This is a minimalist category designed to reflect unsubstantiated discussion 
with minimal details provided. 
Financial distress Whenever the rumour appears to be supported by the fact that the target 
firm is or recently has been experiencing substantial financial or operating 
distress (e.g. “struggling”). 
Financial advisor Target has retained the services of an investment bank or advisor. 
Financing source Details of how the financing would occur are mentioned. 
Industry activity When rumour mentions that the industry appears ripe for such takeovers, 
this can be offered as support for rumour or bidder indicates interest in 
acquiring some firm in the industry. 
Insider cited Anonymous source cited or specific details provided without naming a 
source and not analyst speculation 
Management concerns Concerns with current management or changes in mgmt. recently occurred 
Options Option or volume increases mentioned as supporting rumour. 
PE fund PE or hedge find rumoured as buyer or involved in promoting deal (e.g. has 
many shares and seen as promoting sale of company) or conditions seen as 
ripe for leveraged buyout. 
Synergy Direct synergy estimates mentioned or specific attributes of the target 
mentioned as supporting the rumour. 
Target denies Target firm denies the parties are in negotiations of any kind. 
Target initiates The rumour is created by the target firm. 
Undervalued The rumour that indicates target firm is undervalued. 
Unusual activity Something odd (on behalf of either the target or potential bidder) seems to 
spark the rumour e.g. meetings cancelled. 
Rumour credible Rumour that ends up to be a takeover within two years. 
Informative This indicates that at least 3 rumour pieces of information are true, not 
counting options and chatter. 












Panel B Definition of control variables 
Control Variables Definition 
Size The log of total assets. 
Sales growth The change in the firm’s sales in the past two years. 
Return on assets (ROA) The ratio of net income to total assets.  
Share turnover Ratio of the number of shares of stock traded for the firm to 
the total shares outstanding. 
Cash ratio Ratio of cash to total assets. 
Concentration ratio The ratio of sales of the largest four firms (in terms of sales) 
to total industry sales. 
Sales shock The absolute value of the difference between two-year 
median industry sales growth and the two-year firm sales 
growth. 




































Cross-sectional abnormal returns to rival firms 
This table presents abnormal returns to rumour targets and their rival firms over an 11-day window 
surrounding the rumour date, along with results for a t-test for differences in means and a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in medians. The abnormal returns for both groups are obtained 
using a standard event study with expected returns based on a market model. We use 100 trading days to 
estimate the expected return and residual return variance, where a minimum of 70 valid returns should be 
found within these 100 days. We leave a 50-day gap between the end of the estimation window and the 
beginning of the event window so as to reduce the likelihood that the risk model estimation is affected by 
the event-induced return variance.  
Day N Mean AR (%) 
p-value 
t-test 
Median AR (%) 
p-value 
Wilcoxon test 
-5 1,469 0.07 0.48 -0.08 0.46 
-4 1,470 0.11 0.25 -0.02 0.92 
-3 1,472 0.03 0.76 -0.05 0.34 
-2 1,472 0.01 0.30 -0.04 0.99 
-1 1,471 0.02 0.83 -0.13 0.09 
0 1,472 0.15 0.16 -0.03 0.89 
+1 1,472 0.20 0.03 0.05 0.28 
+2 1,472 -0.00 0.86 -0.12 0.08 
+3 1,472 -0.01 0.30 -0.13 0.00 
+4 1,470 -0.16 0.11 -0.13 0.04 
+5 1,469 0.10 0.29 -0.06 0.36 
(-1,+1) 1,472 0.37 0.02 0.02 0.15 
(0,+1) 1,472 0.35 0.01 0.04 0.15 



























Distribution of abnormal rumour period (-1,+1) returns for rival firms according to industry activities and 
rival post-rumour takeover activity. 
Rumours are categorized based on their content, credibility and informativeness. This table reports the 
CARs of rival firms in the same manner, along with two additional variables identifying the rivals’ post-
rumour acquisition outcomes. “Rival acquired” indicates rivals that subsequently become takeover targets 
within 3 years after the rumour date, and “Rival acquired one year” are rivals that become a target within 
one year following the rumour. Results on t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test are also given 
in the table. 














All rumours 1,472 0.37 0.02 0.02 0.15 
Acquirer mentioned 616 0.41 0.14 -0.04 0.59 
Analyst source 450 0.03 0.92 -0.01 0.46 
Bidder denies 19 0.50 0.69 -0.62 0.60 
Block purchase 44 0.25 0.71 -0.11 0.88 
Chatter 421 0.39 0.19 -0.11 1.00 
Financial distress 53 1.71 0.25 0.70 0.77 
Financial advisor 168 -0.05 0.93 0.06 0.70 
Financing source 23 1.29 0.37 0.15 0.72 
Industry activity 178 1.44 0.03 1.02 0.00 
Insider cited 191 0.31 0.46 0.08 0.63 
Management concerns 34 -0.21 0.81 0.15 0.86 
Options 359 0.58 0.06 0.05 0.22 
PE fund 172 0.43 0.29 0.23 0.59 
Synergy 57 0.22 0.74 0.48 0.47 
Target denies 13 1.41 0.29 -0.15 0.55 
Target initiates 236 0.31 0.25 0.03 0.54 
Undervalued 265 0.49 0.14 0.11 0.86 
Unusual activity 30 0.83 0.21 0.63 0.15 
Rumour credible 293 0.70 0.02 0.08 0.14 
Informative 360 0.34 0.39 0.08 0.24 
Speculative 261 0.20 0.51 -0.06 0.89 
Rival acquired 74 0.26 0.66 -0.23 0.89 
















OLS regression of rumour period abnormal returns (-1,+1) for rival firms 
This table measures the impact of different rumour types on the stock prices of rival firms. CARs are 
obtained using standard event study methodology with expected returns based on the market model. We 
include dummy variables for each rumour type and our control variables in each OLS. Specifically, we 
include the 18 basic rumour types in Model 1, and then control for rumours’ credibility and rivals’ future 
acquisition respectively in Model 2 and Model 3. Corresponding to the first 3 models, control variables 
predicting takeover candidacy (as per Cornett et. al, 2011) are incorporated in Model 5 to Model 7. In 
Model 4, we assess how a rumour’s informativeness affected the rival’s performance. 










Acquirer mentioned 0.00079 (0.831)       
Analyst source -0.0078* (0.079)       
Bidder denies -0.00066 (0.965)       
Block purchase -0.0015 (0.884)       
Chatter -0.0019 (0.697)       
Financial distress 0.016* (0.078)       
Financial advisor -0.0073 (0.253)       
Financing source 0.0061 (0.649)       
Industry activity 0.014*** (0.007)       
Insider cited -0.00079 (0.887)       
Management concerns -0.0069 (0.536)       
Options 0.0030 (0.514)       
PE Fund 0.00086 (0.877)       
Synergy -0.00042 (0.962)       
Target denies 0.0087 (0.627)       
Target initiates 0.0016 (0.798)       
Undervalued 0.0027 (0.545)       
Unusual activity 0.0055 (0.634)       
Rumour credible   0.0041 (0.317)     
Informative       0.000089 (0.983) 
Speculative       -0.0030 (0.519) 
Rival acquired one year     0.011 (0.278)   
Size       -0.00051 (0.610) 
Sales growth       -0.000080 (0.483) 
ROA       -0.056*** (0.009) 
Share turnover       -0.0013 (0.338) 
Cash ratio       0.010 (0.247) 
Concentration ratio       0.0045 (0.596) 
Sales shock       0.024** (0.027) 
MTB       -0.00030 (0.804) 
Constant 0.0033 (0.487) 0.0029 (0.114) 0.0034** (0.039) 0.016 (0.367) 
N 1,472  1,472  1,472  1,357  
R2 0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  
Adjusted R2 -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  
F 0.90  1.00  1.18  1.72  
p-values in parentheses 














Acquirer mentioned 0.00069 (0.855)     
Analyst source -0.0068 (0.137)     
Bidder denies 0.00080 (0.957)     
Block purchase -0.00070 (0.946)     
Chatter -0.0030 (0.550)     
Financial distress 0.014 (0.134)     
Financial advisor -0.0065 (0.325)     
Financing source 0.0076 (0.574)     
Industry activity 0.010* (0.059)     
Insider cited 0.0010 (0.863)     
Management concerns -0.0079 (0.484)     
Options 0.0041 (0.390)     
PE Fund 0.0037 (0.514)     
Synergy 0.000076 (0.993)     
Target denies 0.011 (0.540)     
Target initiates 0.0018 (0.780)     
Undervalued 0.0016 (0.725)     
Unusual activity 0.0056 (0.646)     
Rumour credible   0.0049 (0.247)   
Informative       
Speculative       
Rival acquired one year     0.0089 (0.395) 
Size -0.00081 (0.442) -0.00048 (0.634) -0.00054 (0.591) 
Sales growth -0.000085 (0.460) -0.000088 (0.442) -0.000084 (0.460) 
ROA -0.054** (0.013) -0.056*** (0.008) -0.055*** (0.009) 
Share turnover -0.0015 (0.265) -0.0013 (0.329) -0.0013 (0.317) 
Cash ratio 0.011 (0.231) 0.010 (0.241) 0.010 (0.242) 
Concentration ratio 0.0041 (0.637) 0.0040 (0.635) 0.0044 (0.607) 
Sales shock 0.023** (0.037) 0.025** (0.023) 0.024** (0.028) 
MTB -0.00027 (0.824) -0.00033 (0.790) -0.00034 (0.783) 
Constant 0.020 (0.294) 0.015 (0.403) 0.017 (0.356) 
N 1,357  1,357  1,357  
R2 0.02  0.01  0.01  
Adjusted R2 0.00  0.01  0.01  
F 1.10  2.01  1.94  
p-values in parentheses 





Robustness test 1: OLS regression of rumour period abnormal returns (-1,+1) for rival firms 
This table measures the impact of different rumour types on the stock prices of rival firms. CARs are 
obtained using standard event study methodology with expected returns based on the market-adjusted 
model. We include dummy variables for each rumour type and our control variables in each OLS. 
Following Table 5, we include the 18 basic rumour types in Model 1, and then control for rumours’ 
credibility and rivals’ future acquisition respectively in Model 2 and Model 3. Corresponding to the first 3 
models, control variables predicting takeover candidacy (as per Cornett et. al, 2011) are incorporated in 
Model 5 to Model 7. In Model 4, we assess how a rumour’s informativeness affected the rival’s 
performance. 










Acquirer mentioned 0.00063 (0.864)       
Analyst source -0.0100** (0.023)       
Bidder denies 0.0041 (0.783)       
Block purchase -0.0068 (0.507)       
Chatter -0.0013 (0.779)       
Financial distress 0.017* (0.061)       
Financial advisor -0.0069 (0.278)       
Financing source 0.0083 (0.531)       
Industry activity 0.015*** (0.005)       
Insider cited -0.0013 (0.814)       
Management concerns -0.0075 (0.502)       
Options 0.0040 (0.380)       
PE Fund 0.0013 (0.807)       
Synergy 0.0025 (0.772)       
Target denies 0.00070 (0.968)       
Target initiates -0.000021 (0.997)       
Undervalued 0.0018 (0.679)       
Unusual activity 0.0045 (0.699)       
Rumour credible   0.0040 (0.323)     
Informative       0.000088 (0.983) 
Speculative       -0.0019 (0.680) 
Rival acquired one year     0.012 (0.219)   
Size       -0.00069 (0.490) 
Sales growth       -0.000085 (0.457) 
ROA       -0.038* (0.076) 
Share turnover       -0.00084 (0.523) 
Cash ratio       0.0066 (0.450) 
Concentration ratio       0.0061 (0.477) 
Sales shock       0.029*** (0.009) 
MTB       0.00056 (0.645) 
Constant 0.0047 (0.311) 0.0037** (0.042) 0.0042** (0.012) 0.011 (0.537) 
N 1,472  1,472  1,472  1,357  
R2 0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  
Adjusted R2 0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00  
F 1.13  0.98  1.51  1.35  
p-values in parentheses 















Acquirer mentioned 0.00086 (0.818)     
Analyst source -0.0089* (0.052)     
Bidder denies 0.0057 (0.700)     
Block purchase -0.0059 (0.568)     
Chatter -0.0020 (0.685)     
Financial distress 0.013 (0.150)     
Financial advisor -0.0048 (0.472)     
Financing source 0.010 (0.446)     
Industry activity 0.011* (0.052)     
Insider cited 0.00022 (0.970)     
Management concerns -0.0079 (0.481)     
Options 0.0050 (0.291)     
PE Fund 0.0040 (0.482)     
Synergy 0.0044 (0.624)     
Target denies 0.0036 (0.846)     
Target initiates 0.00094 (0.884)     
Undervalued 0.0011 (0.814)     
Unusual activity 0.0047 (0.699)     
Rumour credible   0.0052 (0.223)   
Informative       
Speculative       
Rival acquired one year     0.0095 (0.343) 
Size -0.00098 (0.351) -0.00063 (0.528) -0.00070 (0.485) 
Sales growth -0.000094 (0.413) -0.000091 (0.423) -0.000087 (0.442) 
ROA -0.034 (0.112) -0.038* (0.071) -0.038* (0.076) 
Share turnover -0.0011 (0.414) -0.00084 (0.522) -0.00087 (0.509) 
Cash ratio 0.0074 (0.397) 0.0066 (0.443) 0.0065 (0.450) 
Concentration ratio 0.0052 (0.553) 0.0056 (0.513) 0.0059 (0.487) 
Sales shock 0.027** (0.013) 0.029*** (0.007) 0.028*** (0.010) 
MTB 0.00056 (0.649) 0.00057 (0.640) 0.00056 (0.646) 
Constant 0.016 (0.412) 0.0096 (0.595) 0.011 (0.537) 
N 1,357  1,357  1,357  
R2 0.02  0.01  0.01  
Adjusted R2 0.00  0.00  0.00  
F 1.06  1.64  1.58  
p-values in parentheses 















Robustness test 2: OLS regression of rumour period abnormal returns (-2,+2) for rival firms 
This table measures the impact of different rumour types on the stock prices of rival firms. CARs are 
obtained using standard event study methodology with expected returns based on the market model. We 
include dummy variables for each rumour type and our control variables in each OLS. Following Table 5, 
we include the 18 basic rumour types in Model 1, and then control for rumours’ credibility and rivals’ 
future acquisition respectively in Model 2 and Model 3. Corresponding to the first 3 models, control 
variables predicting takeover candidacy (as per Cornett et. al, 2011) are incorporated in Model 5 to Model 
7. In Model 4, we assess how a rumour’s informativeness affected the rival’s performance. 










Acquirer mentioned -0.0011 (0.809)       
Analyst source -0.0053 (0.342)       
Bidder denies 0.0069 (0.713)       
Block purchase -0.0020 (0.875)       
Chatter -0.0100 (0.100)       
Financial distress 0.012 (0.305)       
Financial advisor -0.016** (0.042)       
Financing source 0.000010 (1.000)       
Industry activity 0.016** (0.019)       
Insider cited -0.0027 (0.701)       
Management concerns -0.014 (0.339)       
Options 0.0100* (0.087)       
PE Fund 0.0021 (0.765)       
Synergy -0.00048 (0.965)       
Target denies 0.012 (0.601)       
Target initiates 0.0092 (0.245)       
Undervalued 0.0011 (0.842)       
Unusual activity -0.0044 (0.768)       
Rumour credible   0.00038 (0.941)     
Informative       -0.0037 (0.480) 
Speculative       -0.0049 (0.404) 
Rival acquired one year     0.021 (0.169)   
Size       0.000041 (0.974) 
Sales growth       -0.00016 (0.260) 
ROA       -0.066** (0.014) 
Share turnover       -0.0019 (0.249) 
Cash ratio       0.023** (0.036) 
Concentration ratio       0.0074 (0.498) 
Sales shock       0.035** (0.012) 
MTB       -0.0020 (0.190) 
Constant 0.0054 (0.365) 0.0045** (0.049) 0.0042** (0.043) 0.020 (0.380) 
N 1,472  1,472  1,472  1,357  
R2 0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02  
Adjusted R2 -0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.01  
F 1.00  0.0054  1.89  2.29  
p-values in parentheses 















Acquirer mentioned -0.00074 (0.877)     
Analyst source -0.0065 (0.268)     
Bidder denies 0.0086 (0.651)     
Block purchase -0.0044 (0.740)     
Chatter -0.011* (0.094)     
Financial distress 0.010 (0.379)     
Financial advisor -0.016* (0.055)     
Financing source 0.00080 (0.963)     
Industry activity 0.012* (0.096)     
Insider cited -0.0027 (0.718)     
Management concerns -0.015 (0.285)     
Options 0.0099 (0.106)     
PE Fund 0.0065 (0.372)     
Synergy -0.0012 (0.917)     
Target denies 0.012 (0.606)     
Target initiates 0.0080 (0.331)     
Undervalued 0.00092 (0.876)     
Unusual activity -0.0050 (0.749)     
Rumour credible   0.00075 (0.890)   
Informative       
Speculative       
Rival acquired one year     0.017 (0.262) 
Size -0.00038 (0.777) -0.000017 (0.989) 0.000031 (0.980) 
Sales growth -0.00017 (0.249) -0.00017 (0.255) -0.00016 (0.257) 
ROA -0.065** (0.017) -0.066** (0.016) -0.066** (0.015) 
Share turnover -0.0023 (0.181) -0.0020 (0.239) -0.0020 (0.234) 
Cash ratio 0.024** (0.032) 0.024** (0.033) 0.024** (0.032) 
Concentration ratio 0.0065 (0.557) 0.0080 (0.464) 0.0079 (0.468) 
Sales shock 0.033** (0.018) 0.035** (0.013) 0.035** (0.013) 
MTB -0.0020 (0.212) -0.0021 (0.178) -0.0021 (0.184) 
Constant 0.028 (0.264) 0.019 (0.410) 0.019 (0.414) 
N 1,357  1,357  1,357  
R2 0.03  0.02  0.02  
Adjusted R2 0.01  0.01  0.01  
F 1.43  2.44  2.58  
p-values in parentheses 





Logistic regressions predicting rivals’ post-rumour takeover likelihood 
Out of the 1,472 rivals in our sample, 37 rivals are found to be acquired within 365 calendars days after the rumour date. We create a dummy variable, “Rival 
acquired one year” which equals one if the rival is acquired within one year after the rumour and zero otherwise. Using this dummy variable as our dependent 
variable, we employ a series of logistic regressions to explore the predictive abilities different rumour types have on post-rumour rival acquisition likelihood. 




















Acquirer mentioned -0.21 (0.535)   -0.17 (0.634)       
Analyst source 0.34 (0.493)   0.39 (0.433)       
Bidder denies 0.17 (0.879)   0.17 (0.887)       
Block purchase 0.32 (0.662)   0.39 (0.605)       
Chatter 0.054 (0.927)   0.067 (0.910)       
Financial advisor 0.90* (0.062)   0.71 (0.169)       
Financing source 0.46 (0.689)   0.34 (0.773)       
Industry activity 0.33 (0.567)   0.42 (0.477)       
Insider cited 1.04** (0.017)   1.17** (0.014)       
Options 0.22 (0.706)   0.34 (0.566)       
PE Fund 0.95** (0.029)   0.88** (0.037)       
Synergy 1.17* (0.087)   1.28* (0.067)       
Target denies 1.65** (0.015)   1.65** (0.020)       
Target initiated 0.11 (0.836)   -0.018 (0.976)       
Undervalued 0.28 (0.541)   0.31 (0.500)       
Unusual activity 0.29 (0.716)   0.54 (0.505)       
Rumour credible   2.95*** (0.000)   2.92*** (0.000)     
Informative         1.18*** (0.001)   
Speculative         0.051 (0.932)   
Size     -0.15 (0.137) -0.095 (0.373) -0.21** (0.012) -0.15* (0.093) 
Sales growth     -0.00015 (0.959) -0.0032 (0.268) -0.0012 (0.593) -0.00017 (0.943) 
ROA     1.52 (0.430) 1.66 (0.543) 1.16 (0.527) 1.81 (0.345) 
Share turnover     -0.017 (0.911) 0.038 (0.837) 0.074 (0.616) 0.0049 (0.974) 
Cash ratio     -0.058 (0.952) -0.18 (0.861) -0.39 (0.716) -0.071 (0.938) 
Concentration ratio     0.74 (0.397) 0.10 (0.907) 0.40 (0.659) 0.46 (0.566) 
Sales shock     -0.17 (0.916) 0.57 (0.644) 0.17 (0.907) -0.67 (0.724) 
MTB     -0.24 (0.302) -0.21 (0.292) -0.17 (0.346) -0.29 (0.178) 
Constant -4.50*** (0.000) -5.11*** (0.000) -3.38 (0.106) -4.72** (0.040) -3.40 (0.123) -2.48 (0.192) 
N 1,458  1,458  1,345  1,345  1,345  1,345  
Pseudo R2 0.07  0.19  0.08  0.20  0.01  0.02  
p-values in parentheses     





Robustness test: Logistic regressions predicting rivals’ post-rumour takeover likelihood within 3 years after the rumour date 
Out of the 1,472 rivals in our sample, 74 rivals are found to be acquired within 3 years after the rumour date. We create dummy variable, “Rival acquired” which 
equals one if the rival is acquired after the rumour and zero otherwise. Using this dummy variable as our dependent variable, we examine whether our results in Table 
8 are robust.  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
 Rival  
acquired 











Acquirer mentioned -0.15 (0.583)   -0.063 (0.826)       
Analyst source 0.38 (0.287)   0.37 (0.324)       
Bidder denies 1.33** (0.049)   1.46** (0.039)       
Block purchase -0.10 (0.864)   -0.094 (0.878)       
Chatter -0.060 (0.891)   0.081 (0.854)       
Financial distress -1.46 (0.181)   -1.39 (0.213)       
Financial advisor 1.42*** (0.000)   1.32*** (0.001)       
Financing source -0.23 (0.840)   -0.28 (0.814)       
Industry activity 0.29 (0.493)   0.30 (0.511)       
Insider cited 0.93*** (0.003)   1.01*** (0.003)       
Management concerns 0.069 (0.928)   0.0039 (0.996)       
Options -0.21 (0.670)   -0.25 (0.628)       
PE Fund 1.30*** (0.000)   1.38*** (0.000)       
Synergy 1.00* (0.067)   1.19** (0.036)       
Target denies 1.43** (0.020)   1.43** (0.023)       
Target initiated 0.40 (0.311)   0.34 (0.426)       
Undervalued 0.19 (0.602)   0.22 (0.571)       
Unusual activity -0.82 (0.286)   -0.63 (0.417)       
Rumour credible   3.49*** (0.000)   3.42*** (0.000)     
Informative         1.20*** (0.000)   
Speculative         -0.23 (0.611)   
Size     -0.15* (0.061) -0.18** (0.036) -0.20*** (0.001) -0.22*** (0.001) 
Sales growth     0.00016 (0.953) -0.0045* (0.090) 0.0015 (0.507) -0.00055 (0.802) 
ROA     0.62 (0.644) -0.24 (0.886) 0.80 (0.490) 0.68 (0.567) 
Share turnover     0.0085 (0.940) 0.072 (0.597) 0.037 (0.723) 0.019 (0.856) 
Cash ratio     0.12 (0.846) -0.50 (0.463) -0.17 (0.786) -0.26 (0.664) 
Concentration ratio     0.67 (0.324) 0.12 (0.852) 0.78 (0.204) 0.51 (0.387) 
Sales shock     -0.038 (0.976) 0.87 (0.334) -0.37 (0.766) -0.61 (0.659) 
MTB     -0.12 (0.356) -0.12 (0.298) -0.16 (0.227) -0.21 (0.133) 
Constant -3.86*** (0.000) -4.75*** (0.000) -3.34** (0.044) -4.36** (0.010) -2.62* (0.072) -1.66 (0.222) 
N 1,458  1,458  1,345  1,345  1,345  1,345  
Pseudo R2 0.12  0.28  0.14  0.29  0.06  0.02  
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01     
 
